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Abstract
Remote electronic voting is used in several countries for legally binding elec-
tions. Unlike academic voting protocols, these systems are not always documented
and their security is rarely analysed rigorously.
In this paper, we study a voting system that has been used for electing political
representatives and in citizen-driven referenda in the Swiss canton of Neuchâtel.
We design a detailed model of the protocol in ProVerif for both privacy and veri-
fiability properties. Our analysis mostly confirms the security of the underlying
protocol: we show that the Neuchâtel protocol guarantees ballot privacy, even
against a corrupted server; it also ensures cast-as-intended and recorded-as-cast
verifiability, even if the voter’s device is compromised. To our knowledge, this is
the first time a full-fledged automatic symbolic analysis of an e-voting system used
for politically-binding elections has been realized.
1 Introduction
Remote electronic voting (or Internet voting) allows voters to vote from their home
or when they are travelling. It is also seen as a means to get feedback from citizens
on a more regular basis. Therefore, Internet voting has been used in legally binding
elections in several countries, including e.g. Estonia [20], Australia [9], France [29]
or Switzerland [18]. Of course, designing and implementing a secure electronic voting
system is a difficult task and many attacks or weaknesses have been discovered on
deployed systems (see e.g. [33, 32]). Voting protocols should offer some basic security
guarantees, such as ballot privacy (no one knows how I voted) as well as verifiability
(voters can check the voting process) with as few trust assumptions as possible.
On an academic level, several Internet voting protocols have been developed and
some of them offer a prototype implementation or even a voting platform. This is for
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example the case of Helios [1], Civitas [11], Belenios [12], or Select [26]. These pro-
tocols are well documented and typically come with a proof of their security, at least
w.r.t. privacy, in a symbolic or a cryptographic model (see e.g. [4, 22, 26, 12]). On
the other hand, industrial scale protocols are being deployed and now also aim at of-
fering some verifiability properties. For instance some systems offer voters to check
their vote. Some examples are: the Estonian [21] protocol, where voters can check
their vote during a short period of time; the so-called Norwegian protocol [19], that
does so using return codes; or the New South Wales iVote protocol [9]. The systems
deployed in Norway and New South Wales have been (co)-developed by Scytl, a com-
pany specialized in e-voting solutions. Each of those systems has been adapted to suit
the requirements and needs of each jurisdiction.
Contributions. In this paper, we analyze the next generation of the Norwegian proto-
col [19, 18], that has been deployed and is being used in the Swiss cantons of Neuchâtel
and Fribourg [30]. Our main contribution is a thorough analysis of the Neuchâtel pro-
tocol (as specified in [18, 31]) in ProVerif. The tool ProVerif [5, 6] is a state-of-the-art
tool for the formal analysis of security protocols. We are able to prove ballot privacy
(modelled as an equivalence property) as well as cast-as-intended and recorded-as-cast
verifiability (modelled as a reachability property).
It should be noted that the Neuchâtel protocol, as well as most industrial-scale
protocols, is not fully verifiable according to the academic tradition, since the content of
the ballot box is not publicly disclosed. Instead, the protocol aims at providing cast-as-
intended verifiability: if the voting server registers a ballot in the name of a voter then
the ballot contains the vote intended by the voter, even if the voting device is corrupted
and tries to cast a vote for another voting option. Cast-as-intended is achieved through
return codes: after casting a vote, a voter receives a code and checks (on her voting
card) that it matches the code displayed next to her intended choice. The Neuchâtel
protocol additionally guarantees recorded-as-cast verifiability: if a voter completes the
voting process then she is guaranteed that her ballot, as built by her voting device, has
reached the voting server. These two verifiability properties hold under the assumption
that the voting server is not compromised. Note that cast-as-intended verifiability is
not offered by academic systems such as Civitas [11] and Belenios [12]. Often when
it is offered quite a burden is placed on the voter: this is the case for Helios (cast-or-
audit mechanism [1, 24]), where the voter needs to use two voting devices that are not
simultaneously compromised. Namely, the device used for auditing the vote needs to
be different from the device used to cast the vote.
In order to prove our security claims, we present a detailed model of the protocol,
that includes for example the authentication phase after which the voter retrieves her
voting credentials (i.e. by opening a password-protected keystore). Whereas such an
initialization phase must be present in any real-world e-voting system, it is omitted in
virtually every security analysis. Even worse, such authentication mechanism is typi-
cally not specified by the protocols in the academic literature. This is not necessarily
surprising, and it might stem from the fact academic research artefacts often do not get
used in practice and thus do not need to be described as a fully detailed system. Addi-
tionally, we capture in our model elections where voters can select k options among n
voting options (while systems in the literature are often analysed in the case of elections
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where voters selects 1 option among n or even 1 among 2).
We chose to perform an automated security analysis using ProVerif (instead of a
manual proof) precisely to be able to model as many details as possible. We also believe
that our model could serve as a basis for further studies of other voting protocols, as it
is easier to adapt a symbolic model than a manual proof.
One difficulty we had to face resides in the fact that ProVerif does not handle well
protocols with global states. This is of particularly critical importance in the case of
the Neuchâtel protocol, since it becomes insecure (w.r.t. cast-as-intended) as soon as
revoting is allowed. It is therefore crucial to model the fact that each voter votes “at
most once”, and to do it in such a way that ProVerif can still handle the resulting
model and provide a proof. Again, we believe that the techniques developed here to
circumvent this issue are likely to be found useful elsewhere.
Our analysis mostly confirms the security of the protocol: we prove in ProVerif bal-
lot privacy against a dishonest voting server as well as cast-as-intended and recorded-
as-cast against a dishonest voting device, for an unbounded number of voting options
and of voters. However, while modelling the protocol, we also discovered small vari-
ations thereof, which could realistically come up when implementing the protocol in a
real scenario, that would render the protocol insecure in practice.
Related Work. The study most closely related to this paper is the analysis of the Nor-
wegian protocol [16], that solely studies ballot privacy. The Norwegian protocol is
an ancestor of the Neuchâtel protocol. The goal of the analysis in [16] was to pro-
vide a modelling as precise as possible of the protocol’s underlying primitives (with
associativity and commutativity properties) and prove ballot privacy by hand, which
was accomplished by developing some general lemmas regarding equivalence. A brief
analysis was also performed in ProVerif but in a quite abstract model. Reusing the
previous model was deemed to be not possible, as the Neuchatel protocol has evolved
quite significantly and the resulting equational theories for the atomic primitives are
different.
Earlier research proposed the first symbolic models of electronic protocols. This
includes a model of JCJ [3] and Helios [17, 15]. These models solely study privacy
properties and consider a simpler scenario where voters select one candidate among
a finite number of options. These protocols also allow revoting, which significantly
simplifies the analysis in ProVerif (cf. the discussion above on dealing with a global
state).
Computational proofs of privacy and/or some verifiability properties have been pro-
vided for Helios [4], Civitas [22], Select [26], Belenios [12] and [23] for example.
Cyrptographic models are more accurate w.r.t. the underlying primitives and consider
a more powerful attacker, which may for example exploit algebraic properties of the
primitives. Most of these proofs are done by hand, with the exception of [14], that
provides a mechanized proof of ballot privacy for Helios-like protocols. Given their
complexity, these proofs focus on the core of the protocol, abstracting away many de-
tails, including detailed analysis of the high-level interactions between the different
parties of the protocol (e.g. computational proofs would typically assume a secure
channel between the voter and the ballot box, without being explicit nor studying how
this is done). The intrinsic complexity of computational proofs of elaborated protocols,
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Figure 1: Overview of Neuchâtel Voting Protocol
as those used in e-voting systems, make those proofs even more error-prone and thus
harder to verify.
2 Overview of the Neuchatel’s system
The Neuchâtel voting protocol involves four main participants: the Voter (V), that casts
a vote with the help of a Voting Device (VD); the Voting Server (S), that interacts with
the voter’s device to store the voter’s ballot in a database, and next it computes return
codes that need to be approved by the voter V; finally the Tallying Authority (T), that
computes the result of the election by tallying the ballots database built by the server.
For the sake of clarity, we summarize the Neuchâtel protocol in the case of a se-
lection of k “ 2 choices among n voting options v1, . . . , vn. Our analysis accounts
however for several values of k other than k “ 2. A synthetic view of the protocol is
provided in Figure 1.
Tallying Authority (T). Creates an ElGamal asymmetric encryption key pair ppkb , skbq.
The public encryption key pkb is communicated to the Registrar. Once the election
is closed, the authority T computes and outputs the result of the election as follows.
From each ballot to be counted, it extracts the ElGamal encryption of the vote. Next,
T applies a mixnet to the resulting ciphertext list, decrypts every entry with the corre-
sponding election decryption key skb and computes a zero-knowledge proof of correct
decryption. The result is simply the multiset of the decrypted votes.
Voter (V). The voter V associated to id enters into her voting device VD her password
pwd id and her preferred voting choices v1, v2. At some point, VD displays short return
codes src1, src2 to the voter. The voter retrieves the codes srcidv1 and src
id
v2 linked to
v1, v2 from her voting card. If the displayed and the retrieved code sets coincide, the
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voter confirms her votes by entering the confirmation code ccid . Finally, VD displays a
short finalization code sfc, which should be equal to the code sfcid on the voter’s card.
In this case, V is ensured that her ballot contains her intended voting options and that
it has been accepted by the voting server S.
Voting Device (VD). The device VD uses the voter’s password pwd id to obtain a key-
store ks id , from which it retrieves the voters’ key pair ppkid , skidq. Next, the device
computes a ballot b “ pctxt, pv1qskid , pv2qskid , ec1, ec2, pkid ,Pq that is received by the
Voting Server. The ballot consists of several parts:
• ctxt “ aenc
`
pkb , φpv1, v2q, r
˘
is an encryption of voting choices v1, v2 using
an ElGamal encryption algorithm aenc, and a bijective compacting function φ
that maps any list of integers to a single integer (this relies on the uniqueness of
prime factors decomposition).
• so-called partial return codes pv1qskid , pv2qskid allow the Voting Server to com-
pute the short return codes srcidv1 , src
id
v2 that appear in the voter’s voting card;
• the remaining components serve to guarantee consistency between ciphertext
ctxt and the partial return codes pv1qskid , pv2qskid , by using a zero-knowledge
proof P.
If the ballot is accepted by the server S, the voting device VD receives short return
codes src1, src2 from the server and displays them to the voter V. Next, on input of
the finalization code ccid entered by the voter, it computes and sends pccidqskid to the
server. Finally, the server sends a short finalization code sfc, to be displayed to the
voter.
Voting Server (S). It interacts with a voter V with identifier id through her voting
device VD as follows. Firstly, the server receives the voter’s identifier id from VD
and replies with the corresponding keystore ks id . Next it receives from VD a ballot
b “ pctxt, pv1q
skid , pv2q
skid , ec1, ec2, pkid ,Pq, and checks that it is a valid ballot. In
particular, it verifies the zero-knowledge proof P and checks that voter V did not vote
already. If valid, the ballot is stored in a database bb. From the partial return codes
pv1q
skid and pv2qskid , the server can compute the values rc1 and rc2 through a keyed
pseudo-random function, and retrieve their corresponding short return codes src1, src1
by looking into a table M. These short codes are sent to VD. Next, if the voter is sat-
isfied with the return codes, S receives the value pccidqskid , from which it can compute
fc (same way as rc) and retrieve it’s short code sfc by looking again into M. The server
S also retrieves a validity proof crf id from M, that tells whether the retrieved code sfc
is valid or not. If all the tests pass, S adds the confirmation values sfc and crf id to
the database (cb here), to keep track that the ballot b was successfully confirmed, and
sends sfc to VD.
3 Framework
In the coming sections we present a ProVerif model of the Neuchatel protocol. A
detailed presentation of the syntax and semantics of ProVerif can be found in [6]. For
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M, N,U ::= terms
x | n | fpM1, . . . ,Mkq where x P V , n P N ,
and f P C
D::= expressions
M | hpD1, . . . , Dkq where h P C YD
φ::= formula
M “ N | φ1 ^ φ2 | φ1 _ φ2 |  φ
P,Q::= processes
0 nil
outpN,Mq;P output
inpN, x : T q;P input
P | Q parallel composition
!P replication
new a : T ;P restriction
let x : T “ D in P assignment
if φ then P conditional
eventpMq;P event
Figure 2: Syntax of the core language of ProVerif.
the sake of readability, we give next an overview of the protocol, focusing on the parts
that are more relevant to our model. Notations and definitions are mainly borrowed
from [6].
3.1 Syntax
We assume a set V of variables, a set N of names, a set T of types. By default in
ProVerif, types include channel for channel’s names, and bitstrings for bitstrings (also
written any). The syntax for terms, expressions, and processes is displayed in Figure 2.
Terms and expressions. Symbols for functions are split into two sets of constructors
C and destructors D respectively. Terms are built over names, variables and construc-
tors and represent actual messages sent over the network, while expressions may also
contain destructors and represent cryptographic computations. Function symbols are
given with their types: gpT1, . . . , Tnq : T means that the function g takes n arguments
as input of types respectively T1, . . . , Tn and returns a result of type T . A substitution
is a mapping from variables to terms, denoted tU1{x1, . . . , Un{xnu. The application
of a substitution σ to a term U , denoted Uσ, is obtained by replacing variables by the
corresponding terms and is defined as usual. We only consider well typed substitutions.
The evaluation of an expression is defined through rewrite rules. Specifically, each
destructor d is associated with a rewrite rule of the form dpU1, . . . , Unq Ñ U , over
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terms. Then the evaluation of an expression is recursively defined as follows:
• gpD1, . . . , Dnq evaluates to U , denoted gpD1, . . . , Dnq ó U , if @i, Di ó Ui,
and g is a constructor (g P C) and U “ gpU1, . . . , Unq; or g is a destructor
(g P D) and there exists a substitution σ such that Ui “ U 1iσ, U “ U 1σ, where
dpU 11, . . . , U
1
nq Ñ U
1 is the rewrite rule associated to g.
• gpD1, . . . , Dnq evaluates to fail, denoted gpD1, . . . , Dnq ó fail, otherwise.
The evaluation JφK of a formula is defined by JM “ MK “ J, JM “ NK “ K
otherwise, and is then extended to ^,_, as expected.
Example 1. To model the simple theory of encryption and concatenation, we consider
a type symkey for symmetric keys and the sets of constructors and destructors with
their associated rewrite rules as follows:
Cbasic “ t pairpany , anyq : any ,
encpsymkey , anyq : any u
Dbasic “ t proj 1panyq : any , proj 2panyq : any ,
decpsymkey , anyq : any u
Rbasic “ t proj 1ppairpx, yqq Ñ x,
proj 2ppairpx, yqq Ñ y, u
decpx, encpy, xqq Ñ x
We often write pm1,m2q instead of pairpm1,m2q and pm1,m2, . . . ,mkq stands for
pm1, pm2, p. . . ,mkqqq.
Processes. Figure 2 provides a convenient abstract language for describing proto-
cols (formally modeled as processes). The output of a message M on channel N is
represented by outpN,Mq;P while inpN, x : T q;P represents an input on channel N ,
stored in variable x. Process P | Q models the parallel composition of P and Q, while
!P represents P replicated an arbitrary number of time. new a : T ;P generates a fresh
name of type T and behaves like P . let x : T “ D in P else Q evaluates D and be-
haves like P unless the evaluation fails, in which case it behaves like Q. eventpMq;P
is used to specify security property: the process emits an event (not observable by an
attacker) to reflect that fact that it reaches some specific state, with some values, stored
in M .
The set of free names of a process P is denoted fnpP q, and the set of it’s free
variables by fvpP q. A closed process is a process with no free variables. Following
ProVerif’s handy notations, we may write inpc,“ xq.P instead of inpc, y : T q.if x “
y then P , where T is the type of x. Similarly, we may write inpc, px : T, y : T 1qq.P
instead of inpc, z : anyq.let x : T “ proj 1pzq in let y : T 1 “ proj 2pzq in P .
Example 2. In the Neuchâtel voting protocol, the Voter interacts with a Voting De-
vice (e.g. her computer or cell phone) to cast her vote. Initially, the voter receives a
voting card with her personal data for the election, including a password pwd (used
to derive the voter’s key and id), one short return code src for each candidate in the
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Voterpc, pwd , j1, j2, src1, src2, ccid , sfcidq :“
outpc, ppwd , j1, j2qq; (* Sends password & choices. *)
inpc, psrc11 : any , src
1
2 : anyqq; (* Gets the return codes. *)
if psrc11 “ src1 ^ src
1
2 “ src2q _ psrc
1
1 “ src2 ^ src
1
2 “ src1q then
eventpconfirmedppwd , j1, j2qq; (* Checks ok; Reaches ’confirmed ’. *)
outpc, ccidq; (* Confirms the vote. *)
inpc,“sfcidq; (* Final confirmation. *)
eventphappyppwd , j1, j2qq. (* All ok; Reaches ’happy’. *)
Figure 3: The Voter Process
list, a confirmation code ccid (sent if the received return codes are valid), and a short
finalization code sfcid (that should correspond to the server’s last acknowledgement
message). For simplicity, we model an election where voters have to select two op-
tions. We model a voter that votes for two options j1, j2, with corresponding return
codes src1, src2 (read from the voting card). The corresponding process is defined in
Figure 3. It communicates on channel c with the voting device. It includes two events
that witness some important states of the voter. They will be used later to formally state
security properties (see Section 5), and are defined by:
Cvoter “ t confirmedppassword , int , intq : any ,
happyppassword , int , intq : any u
3.2 Semantics
A configuration E,P is given by a multiset P of processes, representing the current
state of the processes, and a set E “ pNpub,Nprivq representing respectively the pub-
lic and private names used so far. The semantics of processes is defined through a
reduction relation Ñ between configuration, defined in Figure 4. A trace is a se-
quence of reductions between configurations E0,P0 Ñ ¨ ¨ ¨ Ñ En,Pn. We say that
a trace E0,P0 Ñ˚ E1,P 1 executes an event M if it contains a reduction E,P Y
teventpMq;P u Ñ E,P Y tP u for some E,P, P .
3.3 Properties
As usual, we assume that protocols are executed in an unstrusted network, meaning
that communications over a public network are fully controlled by an attacker who may
eavesdrop, intercept, or send messages. This is easily modeled by executing a protocol
P0 in parallel with an arbitrary process Q. Formally, we assume given a set of public
constructors, subset of the constructors. An adversarial process w.r.t. to a set of names
Npub is a process Q such that fnpQq Ă Npub and Q uses only public constructors (and
destructors). In what follows, all constructors are public, unless otherwise specified.
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E,P Y t0u Ñ E,P
E,P Y tP }Qu Ñ E,P Y tP,Qu
E,P Y t!P u Ñ E,P Y tP, !P u
pNpub,Nprivq,P Y tnew a : T ;P u Ñ pNpub,NprivY
ta1uq, P Y tP ra1{asu where a1 R Npub YNpriv
E,P Y toutpN,Mq;Q, inpN, xq;P u Ñ
E,P Y tQ,P rM{xsu
E,P Y tlet x “ D in P u Ñ E,P Y tP rM{xsu
if D óM and M ‰ fail
E,P Y tif φ thenP u Ñ E,P Y tP u if JφK “ J
E,P Y teventpMq;P u Ñ E,P Y tP u
Figure 4: Transitions between configurations.
3.3.1 Correspondence
Many security properties can be stated as “if Alice reaches some state (e.g. finishes
her session) then Bob must have engage a conversation with her”. This is for example
the case of many variants of agreement properties [27]. ProVerif allows to specify
correspondence properties between events.
Definition 1. A closed process P0 satisfies the correspondence
P0  
m
ľ
i“1
li
ł
j“1
eventpMijq
where the Mi,j do not contain names, if for any (adversarial) closed process Q such
that fnpQ Ă fnpP0q, for any trace tr, for any substitution σ, if tr executes event Mσ,
then there exists σ1 such that Mσ “ Mσ1 and for any i, there exists j such that tr
executes event Mijσ1.
Examples can be found in Section 5.
3.3.2 Equivalence
Observational equivalence of two processes P and Q models the fact that an adversary
cannot distinguish between the two processes. Slightly more precisely, whenever P
may emit on some channel c (interacting with an adversarial process R), then Q can
emit on c as well. For readability, we summarise here the definition of exquivalence
from [6]. We write C ÓN when a configuration C “ E,P with E “ pNpub,Nprivq
can output on some channel N , i.e. if there exists outpN,Mq;P P P such that
fnpNq P Npub. Also, an adversarial context Cr s is a process of the form new n :
bitstrings; | Q where fvpQq “ H and all functional symbols in Q are public, with
being a ’hole’ expected to be filled by a configuration C “ pNpub,Nprivq,P . There-
fore, and assuming that Npriv X fnpQq “ H, the application of one to the other is
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defined by :
CrCs “ pN 1pub,N 1privq,P Y tQu
with N 1pub “ pNpub Y fnpQqqztnu
and N 1priv “ Npriv Y tnu
From this, the definition of observational equivalence follows :
Definition 2. The Observational equivalence between configurations, denoted by «, is
the largest symmetric relation such that C « C1 implies :
• if C ÓN then DC11 s.t. C1 Ñ˚ C11 and C11 ÓN ;
• if C Ñ C1, then DC11 s.t. C1 Ñ˚ C11 and C1 « C11;
• CrCs « CrC1s, for any adversarial context Cr s.
4 Formal model of the Neuchatel’s voting system
We present here the main parts of our formal model. For simplicity, we present a
model for elections with k “ 2 choices to be made amongst n voting options. In our
automated analysis, we generate the model corresponding to any given particular value
k automatically, and then run ProVerif on several values of k (up to k “ 4 due to
ProVerif time out).
4.1 Standard primitives
The Neuchâtel protocol makes use of the standard primitives: symmetric and asymmet-
ric encryption, signatures, hashes and concatenation. We consider the corresponding
types agentId , int , ekey , epkey , skey , spkey , symkey . The constructors and the asso-
ciated rewrite rules are defined as follows.
Cstand “ t skepagentIdq : ekey ,
pubepekeyq : epkey ,
aencpepkey , any , intq : any ,
encpsymkey , anyq : any ,
pairpany , anyq : any ,
skspagentIdq : skey ,
pubspskeyq : spkey ,
signpskey , anyq : any u
Rstand “ t adecpk, aencppubepkq,m, rqq Ñ m
decpk, encpk,mqq Ñ m
proj 1ppairpa, bqq Ñ a
proj 2ppairpa, bqq Ñ b
verifyppubspkq,m, signpk,mqq Ñ ok u
10
where all function symbols are public, except ske and sks that are private. The set of
destructors Dstand can be inferred easily. The term skαpidq represents the private key
of user id w.r.t. scheme α, where α “ e stands for asymmetric encryption while α “ s
stands for signature. The rewrite rules are the standard ones for these primitives. For
example adecpk, aencppubepkq,m, rqq Ñ m models the fact that the plaintext of an
(asymmetric) encryption can be retrieved by decrypting with the corresponding private
key.
4.2 Voting device
A voter id is provided with a password pwd and codes (return codes as well as a
confirmation code). When she connects to the voting server through her voting device,
she first needs to retrieve her personal private key skepδIdppwdqq. The identifier id
of the voter is actually derived from her password, that is id “ δIdppwdq. This key
is stored in a keystore (on the server’s side), encrypted with a key that can be derived
from the password: δKeyppwdq. We therefore introduce the following theory to model
the key store.
Cks “ t δIdppasswordq : agentId ,
δKeyppasswordq : symkey ,
cekeypekeyq : any u
Rks “ t canypcekeypkqq Ñ k u
The corresponding set of destructors Dks can be inferred easily. The functions cany
and cekey are auxiliary functions that convert private keys to bitstring and conversely.
We denote
ksppwdq :“ encpδKeyppwdq, cekeypskepδIdppwdqqqq
the encrypted value stored in the key store for voter δIdppwdq.
As explained in Section 2, the voting device builds a ballot as follows. It encrypts
the choices j1, j2 of the voters; builds pre-return codes for each choice prcpske , j1q,
prcpske , j2q using the private key of the voter; and proves that the return codes cor-
respond to the encrypted votes, through a zero-knowledge proof. This is modeled as
follows.
Czk “ tzkppepkey , epkey , any , int , int , int , ekeyq : any ,
prcpekey , intq : int u
Rzk “ tverifzkpppkb , pk, e, p1, p2,
zkpppkb , pk, e, p1, p2, r, skidq Ñ ok u
with pk “ pubepskidq, e “ aencppkb , v, rq,
p1 “ prcpskid , v1q, p2 “ prcpskid , v2q
with v “ pv1, v2q. Note that here, our model abstracts some properties of the prim-
itives. Indeed, as explained in Section 2, the two choices j1, j2 of the voters are not
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encrypted as a list but are “compacted” in a single integer Φpj1, j2q, which is actually
commutative: Φpj1, j2q “ Φpj2, j1q. Similarly, the zero-knowledge proof compacts
the pre-return codes. Since ProVerif cannot handle associative and commutative prop-
erties, we abstract away these properties, assuming a slightly stronger proof system.
We can now provide the Device process, which is shown in Figure 5.
4.3 Voting server
When the voting server is contacted by some voter id (through her voting device), the
server first needs to retrieve the personal keystore associated to id . Only valid ids,
of the form id “ δIdppwdq, are registered. The server also recovers (for later use) a
signature signpskc , sfcpgka , idqq of the short finalization code sfcpgka , idq that should
be rebuilt and sent at the end by the server (defined in Crc below). The signing key skc
is a fixed long term key of the setup authorities and gka is the global audit key of the
server. We model this data retrieval by considering the following rewrite rule:
Rretrieve “ t GetpδIdppwdq, gkaq Ñ
pksppwdq, signpskc , sfcpgka , idqqq u
The server needs to compute a long return code fpgka , prc1q from the partial return
code prc1 sent by the voter. This long return code is too long to be human readable
and is therefore associated (in a table) to a short return code. This table also provides
a correspondence for long and short finalization codes. This is modeled through the
following theory:
Crc “ t srcpsymkey , agentId , intq : any
sfcpsymkey , agentIdq : any
fpsymkey , intq : symkey
ccpagentIdq : int u
Rrc “ t readRC pfpgka , prcpskepidq, jqqq
Ñ srcpgka , id , jq
readFC pfpgka , prcpskepidq, ccpidqqqq
Ñ sfcpgka , idq u
with cc, src and sfc private function symbols. Actually, short return codes are stored
encrypted using the long return code as a symmetric key. For the sake of clarity, we
omit this part here but it is reflected in our ProVerif’s model.
No revote. One of the main challenging tasks when modeling the voting server is
the fact that it accepts at most one request from each voter. Note that the protocol is
insecure otherwise. Indeed, in case revoting was allowed, a malicious voting device
could first vote as queried by the voter and display the (correct) return codes and then
revotes for the candidate of its choice (discarding the corresponding return codes).
Therefore, it is crucial to model accurately that no voter can vote twice.
12
A first approach (as described in [18]) is to use a table that stores whether a voter
already voted or not. Then, intuitively, the code of the server is (informally) as follows:
if id R Table then proceed and add id to Table
else stop
However, since the voting device may process several requests at the same time, check-
ing whether id R Table is actually insufficient. Indeed, if two requests from the same
voter reach the server at the same time, they would both pass the test id R Table and
both ballots would be accepted. We therefore need a clean lock mechanism, for which
there is a lot of implementation support.
However, when it comes to modeling this lock mechanism in ProVerif, we have
two options. The first option is to encode the lock mechanism directly in ProVerif, for
example using private channels, that can be used as “tokens”. This approach presents
two drawbacks. Firstly, this encoding would necessarily be ad-hoc. And in principle
there would be no assurance that the protocol is secure if the lock mechanism is im-
plemented in another way (and of course, real lock mechanisms will never use private
channels). Secondly, it is also known that ProVerif, due to its internal behavior, can-
not properly handle private channels when used as tokens or, more generally, cannot
handle properly events that happen “at most once”.
Instead, we take a different point of view. We model a voting server that does
not prevent revoting and adds blindly new ballots. Then, instead of asking ProVerif
whether some property φ holds, we query a property of the form
φ_ two ballots have been accepted for the same voter
If ProVerif proves this query, it guarantees that for any execution trace where no 2
ballots are accepted by the server, then φ holds. It is then up to the implementation to
ensure that any execution is such that no 2 ballots for the same voter are accepted by
the server.
This yields a more flexible result: for any realization of the protocol that further
ensures that ”no two ballots from the same voters are accepted”, then the realization
satisfies φ, no matter how the “no revote policy” is actually implemented. We believe
that this approach is of independent interest and could re-used in other contexts when
modeling e.g. lock mechanisms in ProVerif.
Formally, the server simply issues events built from CBB “ tInsertBBpagentId , anyq :
anyu to record the fact that a ballot has been added to the box. The process correspond-
ing to the voting server is then defined in Figure 6. These events are used later to specify
security properties as just discussed.
4.4 Tally process
Once the voting process is over, the tally phase can start. The tally authorities check
the validity of each ballot (same checks as the server); mix the ciphertexts containing
the votes; decrypt the mixed ciphertexts and publish the election result. In our analy-
sis, we consider that either the tally authorities are corrupted (for cast-as-intended and
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Devicepc1, c2, pkbq :“ (* channels c1 with Voter and c2 with Server. *)
inpc1, ppwd : password , j1 : int , j2 : intqq; (* Get password & choices. *)
outpc2, δIdppwdqq; (* Ask for the keystore, *)
inpc2, ks : anyq; (* ... receive keystore, *)
let skid : ekey “ canypdecpδKeyppwdq, ksqq in (* ... retrieve the key. *)
new r : int ; let e “ aencppkb , pj1, j2q, rq in (* Encrypt voter’s choices. *)
let p “ zkpppkb , pubepskidq, e, prcpskid , j1q, prcpskid , j2q, r, skidq in
outpc2, pe, prcpskid , j1q, prcpskid , j1q, pubepskidq, pqq; (* Sends the ballot. *)
inpc2, psrc1 : any , src2 : anyqq; (* Get the short return codes *)
outpc1, psrc1, src2qq; (* ... transmit codes. *)
inpc1, ccid : intq; (* Get confirmation code *)
outpc2, prcpskid , ccidqq; (* ... transmit it. *)
inpc2, sfcid : anyq; (* Get short finalization code *)
outpc1, sfcidq. (* ... transmit it. *)
Figure 5: The Device Process
Serverpc : channel , pkb : epkey , gka : symkey , pkc : spkey , ct : channelq :“
inpc, id : agentIdq; (* New voting requests. *)
let pks : any , crf : anyq “ Getpid , gkaq in (* Recovers the keystore, *)
outpc, ksq; (* ... and transmits it. *)
inpc, b : anyq; (* Waits for a ballot. *)
let pe : any , prc1 : int , prc2 : int ,“pkepidq, p : anyq “ b in (* Parse it. *)
if verifzkpppkb , pkepidq, e, prc1, prc2, pq then (* Checks the proof. *)
eventpInsertBBpid , eqq; (* Table addition. *)
let src1 “ readRC pfpgka , prc1qq in (* Gets the short return codes. *)
let src2 “ readRC pfpgka , prc2qq in
outpc, psrc1, src2qq; (* Sends them to the Voter. *)
! inpc, cm : intq; (* Waits for confirmation. *)
let sfcid : any “ readFC pfpgka , cmqq in (* Gets the finalization code. *)
if verifyppkc , sfcid , crf q in (* Checks the signature. *)
eventpHasVotedpid , eq; (* Vote approval. *)
outpc, sfcidq; outpct, pid , b, sfcid , crf qq (* Confirms; Feeds the Tally. *)
Figure 6: The Server Process
14
recorded-as-cast properties) or that the overall tally process is honest (for ballot pri-
vacy). As we shall see in Section 5 (security properties), we only need to consider two
honest voters, as well as arbitrary many dishonest voters.
Since privacy is ensured as soon as the two honest ballots are mixed, we model
a tally process that mixes the two honest ballots only. The mixnet is modeled in a
standard way, by sending the ballots over a private channel called mix concurrently,
thus without fixing the order, and reading them back from that same channel. Formally,
we define two processes: TallyH , as shown in Figure 7 for the honest voters (whose
ballots are mixed); and TallyD as shown in Figure 8 for any dishonest voter (that can be
executed arbitrarily). The process TallyD simply decrypts any (valid) ballot provided
the corresponding id is not an honest voter, that is, is neither ida nor idb.
5 Security properties
The Neuchâtel protocol is designed to achieve cast-as-intended verifiability: even if
the voter’s device is corrupted, the ballot registered in the name of a voter corresponds
to the vote intended by that voter. This offers a strong protection against attackers-
controlled personal computers and smartphones (e.g. through malware). The voting
server shall be trusted for this step. Conversely, the Neuchâtel’s protocol also guaran-
tees vote privacy against a dishonest voting server. Note however that the protocol is
not publicly verifiable: the content of the ballot box is not public and therefore voters
cannot check that the result corresponds to the received ballots. We define next the
security properties proved in ProVerif.
5.1 Verifiability properties
The protocol ensures cast-as-intended and recorded-as-cast: if a voter successfully
completes the voting procedure, she is guaranteed that her ballot has been property
recorded by the voting server.
Cast-as-Intended. The Neuchâtel’s protocol provides Cast-as-Intended verifiabil-
ity: if the server registers a ballot for some voter id then this ballot contains the
votes intended by the voter. This can be formalized by the following correspon-
dence property. Remember that the identity id of a voter is derived from her password
(id “ δIdppwdq).
eventpHasVotedppkb , δIdppwdaq, eqq ñ
D v1, v2, j1, j2, r,
eventpconfirmedppwda, v1, v2qq
^ e “ aencppkb , pj1, j2q, rq
^ ppj1 “ v1 ^ j2 “ v2q _ pj1 “ v2 ^ j2 “ v1qq
(1)
Intuitively, the above reads as follows: if the server issues an event
HasVotedppkb , δIdppwdaq, eq, meaning that he accepted a ballot containing an en-
cryption e, then the voter with password pwda must have had cast a vote pv1, v2q that
corresponds to e. Note that we cannot exclude the case where a malicious device swaps
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the vote (that is, casts pv2, v1q instead of pv1, v2q) and then swaps the received return
codes. This is captured in the property above by allowing the two cases (the option
order has no impact on the way votes are counted).
Unfortunately, ProVerif fails to prove this property. Indeed, cast-as-intended cannot
be guaranteed as soon as the server may answer two requests from the same voter, as
the attacker would then get two sets of return codes and could show the wrong one.
This is explicitly forbidden by the Neuchâtel’s protocol: the server does not answer
to revote queries. However, ProVerif over-approximates the behaviors and takes into
account the case where the server would answer twice (yielding “cannot be proved”).
Instead, we consider the following correspondence property.
eventpHasVotedppkb , δIdppwdaq, eqq ñ
D v1, v2, j1, j2, j3, j4, j5, j6, r, r1, r2,
eventpconfirmedppwda, v1, v2qq
^ e “ aencppkb , pj1, j2q, rq
^ eventpInsertBBpδIdppwdaq, eqq
^ eventpInsertBBpδIdppwdaq, aencppkb , pj3, j4q, r1qqq
^ eventpInsertBBpδIdppwdaq, aencppkb , pj5, j6q, r2qqq
^ pj3 “ v1 _ j4 “ v1q ^ pj5 “ v2 _ j6 “ v2q
(2)
This property states that if the server accepts a ballot containing an encryption e then
the voter corresponding to pwda must have cast a vote pv1, v2q such that the encryption
e has been inserted in the ballot box, on behalf of δIdppwdaq. Moreover, there must
have been two other insertions in the ballot box: one with pj3, j4q and one with pj5, j6q,
such that v1 is equal to either j3 or j4 and v2 is equal to either j5 or j6.
Why is this useful? Because we know that the protocol’s implementation further
guarantees that there is at most one insertion for each voter. Combined with Property 2,
this implies j1 “ j3 “ j5^j2 “ j4 “ j6, hence the desired Property 1 (since v1 ‰ v2).
More formally, for any trace tr of a process, if tr satisfies (2) and is such that there
no distinct insertion for the same voter, that is:
eventpInsertBBpδIdppwdaq, aencppkb , pj3, j4q, r1qqq P tr
^eventpInsertBBpδIdppwdaq, aencppkb , pj5, j6q, r2qqq P tr
ñ pj3 “ j5q ^ pj4 “ j6q ^ pr1 “ r2q
then tr satisfies (1). The proof is immediate.
The first interesting feature of this encoding is of course that it circumvents the
issue that ProVerif over-approximates the no-revote policy. The second feature is that
Property 1 is proved independently of the exact implementation of the no-revote pol-
icy. Assuming that the implementation guarantees that there is at most one insertion
for each voter, then the protocol achieves cast-as-intended, no matter how this is im-
plemented in practice.
Recorded-as-cast. The protocol further guarantees that if a voter completes the
voting process then she is ensured that her vote has been recorded by the server. This
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property can be formally stated as follows.
eventphappyppwda, v1, v2qq ñ
D j1, j2, r,
eventpHasVotedppkb , δIdppwdaq, eqq
^ e “ aencppkb , pj1, j2q, rq
^ pj1 “ v1 ^ j2 “ v2q _ pj1 “ v2 ^ j2 “ v1q
(3)
In our ProVerif model, we further show that the ballot registered by the server is well-
formed and will therefore be accepted at the tally phase. Similarly to cast-as-intended,
this property cannot be proved in ProVerif. So instead, we prove an amended property
which implies the desired property as soon as the implementation guarantees that there
is at most one ballot insertion per voter.
eventphappyppwda, v1, v2qq ñ
D j1, j2, j3, j4, j5, j6, r, r1, r2,
eventpHasVotedppkb , δIdppwdaq, eqq
^ e “ aencppkb , pj1, j2q, rq
^ eventpInsertBBpδIdppwdaq, eqq
^ eventpInsertBBpδIdppwdaq, aencppkb , pj3, j4q, r1qqq
^ eventpInsertBBpδIdppwdaq, aencppkb , pj5, j6q, r2qqq
^ pj3 “ v1 _ j4 “ v1q ^ pj5 “ v2 _ j6 “ v2q
(4)
Trust Assumptions. We prove cast-as-intended (Property 2) and recorded-as-cast
(Property 4) even if the voting device and the tally process are corrupted. We assume
however the voting server to be honest. Formally, we consider the following process:
Init ; !Serverpc, pkb , gka , skc , cq | !Corr
| Voterpc, pwda , v1 , v2 , srcpgka , ida, v1 q,
srcpgka , ida, v2 q, ccpidaq, sfcpgka , idaqq
where Init is an initialization process: it broadcasts ida “ δIdppwdaq and pkepidaq
on some public channel c, generates the elections keys skb , gka and skc , and publishes
pkb “ pubepskbq, pubspskcq, and skb . The process !Corr models an arbitrary number
of dishonest voters: each generates a password pwd i for some voter i and broadcasts
all the corresponding (public and private) data.
Note that we do not need to include the tally process since it is assumed to be
dishonest. Instead, we simply provide the election key (skb) to the adversary: cast-as-
intended and recorded-as-cast properties are guaranteed even if the decryption key is
lost.
5.2 Privacy
Intuitively, a voting protocol guarantees ballot privacy if an attacker cannot learn any
information about how a voter voted. In symbolic models, this is typically formalized
as follows [25, 17]:
VAp0q | VBp1q « VAp1q | VBp0q
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An attacker should not be able to distinguish the case where Alice votes 0 and Bob
votes 1 from the case where the votes are swapped.
We show that the Neuchâtel’s protocol ensures ballot privacy, even if the voting
server and all but two voters (and their voting devices) are corrupted. Formally, we
consider a set up process I similar to Init , but with two honest voters A,B with pass-
words pwdA, pwdB , and a corrupter Server process that leaks its private data gka , skc .
The election key skb (generated during the setup and distributed to election authorities)
is assumed to be secret. We call VApa, bq the process for voter A that votes for a and b.
VApa, bq :“ DevicepcA, c, pkbq
| VoterpcA, pwdA, a, b, srcpgka , idA, aq,
srcpgka , idA, bq, ccpidAq, sfcpgka , idAqq
Then we prove (in ProVerif) that:
I | VApa, bq | VBpc, dq | !Corr | T
« I | VApc, dq | VBpa, bq | !Corr | T
(5)
with T :“ TallyH pc, skb , pkc , idA, idBq
| !TallyDpc, skb , pkc , idA, idBq
ProVerif cannot prove arbitrary equivalences. Instead, it proves diff-equivalence (a
stronger notion of equivalence [7]) of pairs of processes that only differ in treatment
of terms. More formally, ProVerif considers bi-processes P that may contain bi-terms
choicept1, t2q instead of pure terms. Then ProVerif proves equivalence of proj 1pP q
and proj 2pP q where proj ipP q is obtained from P by replacing any occurence of a bi-
term choicept1, t2q by ti. We refer the reader to [7] for a detailed and formal definition
of bi-processes and diff-equivalence.
So proving the equivalence VAp0q | VBp1q « VAp1q | VBp0q amounts into consid-
ering the process
VApchoicep0, 1qq | VBpchoicep1, 0qq
However, applying directly this tranformation to the equivalence (5) yields a process
that ProVerif cannot prove. Instead, we need to further transform it by also swapping
the output of the tally. This is a usual technique, as devised e.g. in [8]. Formally, we
replace the outpmix, eaq | outpmix, ebq part in the TallyH process by:
outpmix, choicepea, ebqq | outpmix, choicepeb, eaqq
Note that since the resulting processes are equivalent (since P | Q « Q | P ), we still
prove the desired equivalence (Property 5).
6 Results and lessons learned
Previous symbol models of electronic voting protocols [3, 17, 15, 16] consider a sim-
ple scenario where the voter selects one candidate among finitely many options. In
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Voting
Device
Server Tally
Cast-as-Intended D H D
Recorded-as-Cast D H D
Ballot Privacy H D H
Table 1: Properties and trust assumptions. D stands for dishonest while H stands for
honest.
Number of option’s choices 1 2 3 4 5
Cast-as-Intended ă 1s ă 1s 2s 8m
time out
ą 48h
Recorded-as-Cast ă 1s ă 1s 3s 20m
time out
ą 48h
Ballot Privacy 14s 49m
time out
ą 48h
time out
ą 48h
time out
ą 48h
Table 2: Security analysis in ProVerif.
this study and for the sake of clarity, we have presented the Neuchâtel’s protocol for
the particular case of an election where k “ 2 options among n options need to be
selected. In our ProVerif model we have considered an arbitrary number of options n,
an arbitrary number of voters m, and several values for the number of selections k. To
be able to cope with an arbitrary number of selections, we would need to handle lists of
arbitrary size (representing the selection of a voter). While there are some preliminary
results for protocols with lists [10, 2, 28], none of them can be applied to our symbolic
mocel for the Neufchâtel protocol. This is why we consider several fixed values for k.
The security properties together with corresponding the trust assumptions are sum-
marized in Table 1 while the experiments are presented in Table 2.
6.1 Results
We run ProVerif version 1.94 on a Xeon E5-2687W v3 @ 3.10GHz. We were able to
analyze cast-as-intended and individual verifiability up to k “ 4 and ballot privacy up
to k “ 2. The detailed analysis times are reported in Table 2. The models in ProVerif
can be found in [13]. As explained in Section 5.2, ballot privacy is expressed as an
equivalence property of the form:
VApa, bq | VBpc, dq « VApc, dq | VBpa, bq
for k “ 2, where a, b, c, d are constants. This implicity means that A and B vote
for distinct options. So in the case k “ 2 we further prove privacy when the two
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honest voters were respectively voting pa, bq, pb, cq, or pa, bq, pc, bq, or pa, bq, pb, aq, to
check that no attack appears when A and B share one or two options. ProVerif proves
these cases in exactly the same time than the case where the four options are pairewise
distinct.
6.2 Lessons learned
Our analysis mostly confirms the security of the Neuchâtel protocol w.r.t. both privacy
and verifiability properties. However, while modeling the protocol we discovered that
flaws may occur in case of small but realistic deviations of the protocol. We reported
these subtleties to the the company that designed the system who confirmed to be aware
of them and that they have been taken care of for the actual implementation.
Exactly k choices. In case of an election where voters select k options out of n, with
k ě 2, voters (and authorities) should be aware (and properly instructed) that voters
should select exactly k options (and not less). Otherwise, a dishonest voting device may
use the remaining “unused” choices for other unexpected voting options (and discard
their return codes).
No duplicate. Still in case of an election where voters select k options out of n, voters
should not be offered the possibility to vote twice for the same option (for example, the
election rules may allow voters to give two choices to the same candidate). Indeed, the
protocol would then be vulnerable to an attack where the intruder uses the duplicated
choice (say Alice votes twice for a, that is, she votes a, a) to make her vote for a, b (and
manually duplicate the return code corresponding to a, to make Alice happy).
Blank vote. It becomes particularly tricky for elections that allow voters to abstain (that
is, vote “blank”). In that case, k different blank voting options must be provided to
voters. Those blank voting options shall have different individual return codes, and
voters shall be advised that they need to check a return code for each blank option. In
other words, if Alice wishes to abstain in an election where voters can select k options
out of n, then she must receive (and check) k distinct return codes, corresponding to k
blank voting options. Of course, in case the election includes several questions (e.g.,
several sub-elections) then these blank options have to be specific to each question.
This may be dificult to understand for voters.
Synchronization. As pointed before, the protocol is no longer secure w.r.t. the cast-
as-intended property as soon as the voting server answers two different requests from
the same voters. (Note that this is explicitly forbidden by the Neuchâtel protocol since
revoting is not allowed). Therefore, the voting server must implement some form of
thread synchronization to guarantee that two different ballots will never be accepted for
the same id , even if none of them has yet been confirmed by the voter. This should be
enforced even when voting servers are duplicated for efficiency reasons. In particular,
the use of tables as described in [18] is insufficient and further requires a proper lock
mechanism.
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7 Conclusion
We provide an automated proof of an e-voting protocol in use for politically-binding
elections in the Swiss cantons of Neuchâtel and Fribourg. Our analysis confirms the se-
curity of the protocol: it ensures cast-as-intended and recorded-as-cast against a dishon-
est voting device (assuming an honest voting server) and it guarantees privacy against
a dishonest voting server (assuming an honest voting device). Previous analysis of
other e-voting protocols (eg [3, 17, 15, 16] ) left several parts of the protocol undefined
because they study protocols that have not been deployed for actual government elec-
tions. Our ProVerif model covers the authentication phase, voters’ cryptographic keys
derivation from passwords (as voters cannot be asked to copy long strings), no revote,
as well as elections where voters may select several options. One particular challenging
aspect of the Neuchâtel protocol is the fact that it forbids re-voting since it would be
insecure otherwise. Due to ProVerif’s over-approximations, we had to propose several
ideas in order to still obtain automated proofs of all the desired properties.
As future work, we plan to explore how we could extend ProVerif in order to cope
with protocols where some events happen only once. This is the case as soon as a
protocol embeds some lock mechanisms or uses of counters.
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TallyH pct : channel , skb : ekey , pkc : spkey , ida : agentId , idb : agentIdq :“
inpct, p“ ida, ba : any , sfca : any , crf a : anyqq;
inpct, p“ idb, bb : any , sfcb : any , crf b : anyqq;
let pea : any , prc
1
a : int , prc
2
a : int ,“ pkepidaq, pa : anyq “ ba in
let peb : any , prc
1
b : int , prc
2
b : int ,“ pkepidbq, pb : anyq “ bb in
if verifzkpppkb , pkepidaq, ea, prc
1
a, prc
2
a, paq ^ verifyppkc , sfca, crf aq
^ verifzkpppkb , pkepidbq, eb, prc
1
b , prc
2
b , pbq ^ verifyppkc , sfcb, crf bq then
outpmix, eaq | outpmix, ebq | inpmix, e
1
a : anyq; inpmix, e
1
b : anyq;
outpc, padecpskb , e
1
aq, adecpskb , e
1
bqqq;
Figure 7: The Tally Process – Honest version
TallyDpct : channel , skb : ekey , pkc : spkey , ida : agentId , idb : agentIdq :“
inpct, pid , b : any , sfc : any , crf : anyqq;
let pe : any , prc1 : int , prc2 : int ,“ pkepidq, p : anyq “ b in
if verifzkpppkb , pkepidq, e, prc
1, prc2, pq ^ verifyppkc , sfc, crf q
^ id ‰ ida ^ id ‰ idb then
outpc, adecpskb , eqq;
Figure 8: The Tally Process – Dishonest version
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